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Abstract Criminal infiltration in the legal economy – particularly public 
procurement and corruption – are among the most pronounced challenges 
facing European states. This work analyses the strategies and methods used 
by organised criminal groups to tamper with the procedures for the execu-
tion of public contracts – with special attention to corruption forms – cov-
ering an issue that never been systematically examined. Before presenting 
the results of this study, the borders of the analysed issue and the general 
phenomenon of criminal infiltration in the legal market will be considered.
Keywords: Organised Crime, Corruption, Public Works, Public Con-
tracts, Criminal Infiltration in the Legal Economy 
Introduction
Some academics and EU institutions highlight the important link 
between corruption and organised crime, which often coexist and 
interact when advantageous.1 Although they are two individual phe-
nomena, they are characterised by actual interrelations, especially in 
reference to the public procurement sector.2 This connection is lit-
tle-explored by scholars and political advisers, although it is important 
to understand the reality of the facts and to identify an effective coun-
ter-strategy. In fact, it can be considered a bridge that produces oppor-
tunities for various actors. For example, organised crime groups can 
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utilise corrupt methods in order to expand their relational networks, 
even outside their own criminal group, increasing human resources in 
various economic sectors, both legal and illegal. At the same time, cor-
ruption can be used to maintain a system of power or relations. Hence, 
the connection between corruption and organised crime is functional 
in creating a grey zone which constitutes an illegal-legal continuum.
Organised crime and corruption – as highlighted by several reports 
and analyses – are among the most acute challenges facing Europe 
which affect all EU member states (EUMS).3 Despite a lack of statistics 
and data on corruption and organised crime-related offences in rela-
tion to public procurements, the importance of these phenomena can 
be understood using estimations and various indicators.4 Consider, for 
instance, people’s perceptions, as shown by a 2014 Eurobarometer sur-
vey: 76% of European citizens surveyed believed corruption to be wide-
spread in their country, while 26% said they were personally affected 
by corruption in their daily life. 73% of European respondents believed 
that bribery and the use of connections is often the easiest way to ob-
tain certain public services. Mistrust in public institutions appears to 
be widespread. According to the same survey, the public offices and 
sectors most distrusted are: political parties; politicians at national, re-
gional and local levels; and officials who award public tenders or issue 
building permits.5
One of the legal sectors mainly engaged is the execution of public 
contracts, public works of construction in particular. As a result, crim-
inal infiltration in public procurements merits attention. In particu-
lar, it is worth analysing the strategies and methods used by organised 
criminal groups for influencing the allocation of public funds and for 
infiltrating public works. In fact, systematic studies on this phenome-
non don’t exist. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain an overview of the 
topic by exploring the literature and reports of national and interna-
tional institutions. Such documents contain interesting – albeit scat-
tered – information on the matter.
Before presenting the main results of the present study, it is impor-
tant to identify the characteristics and the borders of the phenome-
non, and to have a general overview on the topic of criminal infiltra-
tion in the legal economy.
The Borders of the Issue
It is important to clarify the meaning of organised crime as referred 
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to in this work. In fact, among scholars, a standardised definition of 
organised crime is elusive. This is due to various reasons: (a) several 
disciplines (such as law and criminal justice, criminology, international 
relations, sociology, etc.) deal with organised crime and discuss its defi-
nition according to their own specific interests and focus; (b) organ-
ised crime is conceptualised around the world in different ways, using 
various cultural points of reference; (c) organised crime is a label that 
identifies and includes a whole range of different crimes and groups; 
and (d) the legal-illegal nexus as a characterising element of organised 
crime has been under-studied. Although many scholars have studied 
illegal activities carried out by organised criminal groups, the issue of 
criminal infiltration of legal markets has been little-explored.6
Nevertheless, it is worth identifying the borders of the concept of 
organised crime, in order to gain a common theoretical point of ref-
erence and understanding. In this research, organised crime is defined 
‘as a structured and permanent group of individuals who use violence 
[typically, but not exclusively] to gain profit through criminal activi-
ties’.7 Criminal organisations usually achieve their proper aims using 
various strategies: for instance, controlling or conquering portions of 
political power; managing illegal markets or exploiting sections of the 
legal economy; and/or calling off the civil relationships of solidarity. 
Although general, this conceptual definition allows us to distinguish 
organised crime from other groups that use violence, in and of itself, as 
a source of revenue (such as military companies) or as a means to gain 
power (such as terrorist groups).
Then, too, it is important to specify the substantial differences exist-
ing among various type of criminal organisations (such as street gangs, 
mafia and so on), each one characterised by a specific level of crimi-
nal specialisation. In this perspective, organised crime can be thought 
of as a broader category (genus) consisting of various types of groups 
(species) which peculiarity depend on historical and socio-political con-
text. This conceptual representation includes several kinds of criminal 
groups which can be laid out on a continuum, starting from “organised 
crime” thought of as a combination of individuals who commit a se-
ries of felonies; then proceeding on to “crime syndicates” as well-struc-
tured groups which aim to profit economically; and at the end of this 
climax, mafia groups that are the most specialised criminal organisa-
tions which seek also political control of the territory.8
Although so different, mafias and criminal groups often closely co-
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operate or even work in partnership which weakens the distinction 
among them.9
All such criminal groups are engaged, to some degree, in various 
types of illegal activities, among which include the exploitation of 
legal economy especially in the public works sector.  With particular 
reference to criminal infiltration in public works, various criminal 
groups also cooperate with different actors part of the legal world. The 
creation of alliances and/or collusive relations or connivances with 
entrepreneurs, politicians, public administrators, makes criminals in-
creasingly able to infiltrate public sector. Moreover, the involvement 
of professionals, specialised in economic and financial sectors who 
provide consulting services to criminals, play a key role for favouring 
criminal exploitation of legal business. As a result, the relational net-
works among members of both legal and illegal world are fundamental 
to endorse the phenomenon. It is not a chance that several scholars 
underline that various types of criminal groups can be thought of as 
systems based on relational networks.10
The strength of various criminal and mafia groups are mainly de-
rived from their capacity for creating complex relational networks 
which involve figures both in the criminal world and in the legal sphere 
(such as politicians, entrepreneurs and so on). These networks, created 
for gaining advantages, increase chances to illicit profits because they 
guarantee political protection, economic resources, opportunities for 
infiltrating in new market sectors and a wide range for illegal activities.
The network structure of the various criminal groups allows them 
to always create new alliances and to increase the complexity of part-
nerships. The complexity of the criminal systems that are based on re-
lational networks has increased over time with changes in the 1990s, 
especially with the process of globalisation and the rise and spread of 
businesses across borders. Adapting to the global dimension of the 
economic environment, organised crime has become more flexible and 
less hierarchical. The individual mafias and criminals are thus adapted 
to operate in vast and articulated agreements and criminal networks 
that link their interests to the economic activities of the diverse pow-
erful elite. In this situation, the criminal groups tend to operate as a 
business operating within a cluster. In this perspective, the criminal 
clusters develop systematic relationships with other actors in the same 
field of activities and agreements. In this sense, criminal groups are 
linked both to other criminal clusters that have representatives from 
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legal and legitimate institutions.11 The more frequent interaction be-
tween criminals and politicians and public institutions, creates a “gray 
zone” in which legal and illegal are increasingly intertwined and diffi-
cult to distinguish. We are witnessing a merging of networks, relation-
ships and diverse areas.12 This, in addition to being the strength of the 
criminal groups, leads to the spread of the so-called “Mafia methods” 
as a type of behaviour based on occult links and the pursuit of individ-
ual interests. Such misconduct can be taken even by those who do not 
belong directly to the criminal groups as a daily mode of action.13 The 
elements just highlighted allow to identify the borders of the issue and 
to better understand the phenomenon analysed.
An Overview of Criminal Infiltration in Legal Business
To introduce the phenomenon of criminal infiltration in public pro-
curement it is important to give an overview of the economic and fi-
nancial investments of organised crime groups in legal business. The 
proceeds of illegal activities (including sexual exploitation, trafficking 
of weapons or drugs, forgery, trafficking of garbage, extortion, usury 
and so on) are usually reinvested in various sectors of the legal econo-
my. To understand the size of this phenomenon, Italy is a paradigmatic 
example: illegal proceeds amount around to €25.7 billion (equivalent to 
1.7% Italy’s GDP).14 However only between 32% and 51% of this amount 
of money (i.e. from a minimum of 8.3 to a maximum of €13 billion) 
comes from organised crime and mafia groups activities.15
As a matter of fact, organised crime infiltration in legal economy is 
only one aspect of the economic criminality. Various modalities and 
reasons why several criminal groups infiltrate into legal economy are 
intertwined with other organisational prerogatives of the modern eco-
nomic crimes: 1. the so-called white collars criminals who take advan-
tages of business opportunities for money or power. They associate 
with each other for committing economic crimes or for providing ille-
gal services to organised crime; 2. legal companies that illegally operate 
for achieving legal objectives. 
 
1. Often businessmen join with other professionals for establishing 
criminal organisations which, unlike traditional criminal groups, 
rarely use violence and intimidation. Such new organisations 
usually tend to utilise corrupt methods, abuse of power and cli-
entelism. Moreover, such organisations considerably and stra-
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tegically use new technologies for carrying out illegal activities. 
Frequently, white-collar criminals delegate their illegal activities 
to traditional organised crime and mafia associations. In this way, 
they intertwine different interests and skills.16 
2. Several national and international legal cases have highlighted 
that often legal companies utilise illicit tools and illegal associ-
ative forms in order to increase business competition and prof-
its. False invoicing, trust companies, or even false accounting, are 
used to accumulate capital out of the institutional control useful, 
for example, to corrupt and gain economic benefits.    
The mix among criminal infiltration in legal economy and other ac-
tualisations of economical criminality is present in all European coun-
tries.17 The mingling of different worlds (entrepreneurial, business, 
political and institutional, criminal, etc.) and various interests raise 
an important question: what are the favouring factors for economic 
crimes, in general and especially for implementing criminal infiltration 
into legal business?
A key role is played by professionals specialised in economic and fi-
nancial sectors who provide consulting services to organised crime. As 
well as technical skills, these experts provide criminals their experience 
in cross-border money transactions and in diversifying investments.18 
The skills required of various types of professionals differ depending 
on the illegal activities to be pursued. Sometimes, skills in the use of 
computer technology are needed. In other situations, the knowledge 
of legislations (administrative, European, of taxation, of banking, etc.) 
and to tamper with the rules, is a must. With others, a depth of knowl-
edge in financial sectors is crucial.    
The relational nexus among various professions and different types 
of organisations (including traditional criminal groups, white collars, 
and other legitimate economical actors) can be implemented in the 
form of complicity, cooperation or real conspiracy. These links, usually 
based on short, medium and long term agreements, can result in com-
plex and composed scenarios. The intensification of relational net-
works between several economic subjects and criminals lead to the es-
tablishment of a context favourable for committing economic crimes.19
It is worthwhile introducing the meaning of criminal enterprise and 
identifying the aspects which distinguish and favour such enterprises 
in respect of legal companies. Criminal organisations use often tech-
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niques in company management and operate establishing entrepre-
neurial activities. Since the 1970s and 1980s, organisational criminals 
have increasingly become businessmen establishing relationships of 
collusion and connivance with legal companies.20 
Three specific profitable elements distinguish criminal enterprises 
from the legal ones: the discouragement of competition using intim-
idation (which sometimes leads to criminal monopoly of particular 
economical sectors); the wage compression usually implemented by 
way of the tax evasion for social security and the no payment of over-
time; the sizable financial liquidity originating from illegal activities.21 
However, it is important to underline that illegal activities are only one 
of many funding sources for criminal groups. In fact, they can have 
special access to the legal banking system (constituted by local and na-
tional lending institutions) compared to those of legal entrepreneurs.22 
Such advantages are useful indicators to identify the essential as-
pects of criminal enterprises. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to 
characterise a typology of illegal companies. Each illicit enterprise 
works and operates in an particular way for facing the specific mar-
ket conditions created by illegality. As a result, illegal businesses differ 
from each other.23 They have variable structures and establish unstable 
relations with each other based on short term objectives.     
The development of criminal business has not followed the licit 
economic growth. But, it has taken place when illegal enterprises have 
begun to substitute legal companies in some economic sectors.24 This 
process of growth is accompanied by another important aspect: the 
de facto acquisition of legal companies (or parts of them) by criminal 
enterprises. Some studies have shown that criminal groups can grad-
ually become the owners of legal companies or control their activities, 
forcing them to accept their protection in exchange of money. The 
methods used to get control of legal companies are various (including 
extortion, usury, recapitalisation of firms, liquidation of business, etc.). 
The main forms of control are mainly two: participation (when crim-
inal groups controls, for short time, the legal company operations in 
reference to an unique and specific economical sector); sharing (when 
criminals directly acquire the ownership of legal firm and manage its 
corporation stocks). This form of control is a long-lasting relation and 
concerns all business activities of the licit company. In the first case, 
the legal business remains relatively autonomous while committing 
illegal activities. On the contrary in the second case, the company 
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changes its nature and becomes property of the organised crime.25
Investment Sectors of Criminal Organisations
The investment sector, ranging from the real estate business to various 
types of goods and services, is chosen according to the objectives and 
cultural motivations of each criminal group, as well as to the opportu-
nities offered by the market and by the circumstantial context.
According to several authors, criminal infiltration into legal econ-
omy is such a widespread phenomenon what is very difficult to iden-
tify where criminal investments occur.26 Nevertheless, some scholars 
have highlighted that criminals’ investments in companies may be ex-
plained by five aims:
• concealment of criminal activities (mainly money laundering);
• control of the territory;
• social consensus;
• profit (and/or income) maximisation;
• cultural/personal reasons (i.e. criminals invest in certain busi-
ness because it is close to their culture, education background, 
family tradition, status and prestige).27
Criminal groups focus their activities in business which let them 
issuing false invoices and/or falsify accounting, hiding their proceeds 
and concealing incoming and outgoing illicit flows.  Concealment of 
criminal activities can also take different forms. As well as money laun-
dering, it can include the transport and trade of illegal goods hidden 
among legal products. Such illicit operations need cooperation and in-
volvement of legal enterprises. Another channel in concealing illegal 
profits is cross-border money transactions which requires a high level 
of competencies.28
Control of territory and social consensus are very close aims pursued 
by organised criminal groups. They endorse organised criminals to be 
socially accepted in a specific territory. Criminal groups are thus able 
to control particular sectors of the local economy and/or manage the 
subcontracts of local public works, maintaining relations with suppli-
ers, contractors, public administrators and/or politicians. The criminal 
infiltration into the legal economy also allows criminals to be accepted 
by the lower citizenship groups. In fact, operating as economic actors, 
mafia and criminal associations create jobs and new opportunities of 
life. In this way, criminals may recruit partners from among various 
groups of society that are not fully integrated, such as ethnic minori-
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ties.29
Furthermore, scholars have different theories with regards to the 
economical objectives pursued by organised crime which are mainly 
profit (and/or income) maximisation. On one hand, some authors af-
firm that, although important, profit does not play a key role for deci-
sions making in criminal and mafia groups. It is simply one aspect of 
the criminal groups interests, but not the most essential. They argue 
that criminal groups are aimed more at a long term revenue and not to 
a mere short term profit.30 
On the other hand, other thinkers assert that organised criminals 
focus their attention primarily on sectors with a high and immediate 
return on investments and with a risk minimisation.31 As such, the 
economic field where organised crime operates is not so important in 
respect to the opportunities for money laundering and profits that a 
certain business is allowed to realise. It is not by chance that criminal 
and mafia groups have increasingly diversified areas of investments 
and overtaken the entrepreneurial monoculture typical of criminal 
organisations. The latter, until the 1960s and 1970s, was almost exclu-
sively concentrated in real estate and public works. These areas, al-
though still preferred by criminal groups, were gradually joined with 
other economic fields, especially in public services (mainly healthcare, 
private clinics, the treatment of urban and toxic waste). As such, var-
ious criminal groups gradually inserted themselves in each field of 
economic and financial activity.32 Organised criminals select economic 
sectors for their activities on the basis of both their specific aims and 
the attractive opportunities offered.
Independently of the investment sector, criminal infiltration into 
the legal economy produces significant economic and social costs due 
to the alteration of the competitive rules of the market and placing 
illegal proceeds into legal business.33
Criminal Infiltration in Public Procurement: Methods and 
Strategies
Criminal groups are engaged, to some degree, in different types of ille-
gal activities, among which the exploitation of the legal economy op-
portunities is growing in importance. In particular, the opportunities 
given by in the public works sector represent a new area of investment 
for criminal groups. Although systematic analyses on this specific area 
do not exist, the reasons for choosing this sector, the main strategies 
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and methods used by criminal groups can be figure out by the analysis 
of the literature and the reports of national and international institu-
tions.
Reasons of public procurements choice—Various reasons exist 
why criminal groups and the mafia choose the public works sector in 
particular the public procurements. The first reason is economic: the 
expense for public contracts is a great part of the territorial economy 
especially where the private sector is under developed. The second is 
linked to the investigative judicial penal sector: the investigations of 
criminal activity within public contracts are difficult to carry out and 
very costly in term of procedure and personnel. Crimes committed in 
the public sector are harder to detect and to prove compared to other 
ones like, for example, drug trafficking, etc.  The third reason is linked 
to the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the public administration. Es-
pecially in certain Countries, like Italy, the public contract sector dur-
ing the years has revealed its vulnerability to corruption and collusion 
episodes.34 And finally, criminal infiltration has strategic importance 
as a means of territorial control in the penetration of social, economic 
and institutional structures of the territory. In fact, certain businesses 
and sectors (such as restaurants, supplies, construction) can be used 
both for maximising physical control on the territory and for strength-
ening the relationships with politicians and public administrators.35
Channels for exercising influence and for infiltrating public con-
tracts—Analysing the literature and various institutional reports, it is 
possible to hypothesise that organised criminal groups mainly use two 
channels for infiltrating public works and public contracts: (a) direct 
infiltration in the public process of bidding through the direct control 
of private companies i.e. through the use of name and/or members 
of criminal family;  (b) indirect actions where the organised crime acts 
as mediator among companies, politicians and public administration 
using relational networking, persuasion, or even intimidation. This is 
the case of agreements between the criminal exponents and the entre-
preneurs, political, institutional and public representatives in order to 
assure their desired motive. 
These channels are context specific. Organised criminal groups be-
haviour changes according to the characteristics of their own structure 
and abilities, the features of the market and the opportunity of the mo-
ment. The choice of such channels depend, not only on the objectives 
of criminal groups, and on the context, but also on the phase of the 
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public procurement process in which criminals want to infiltrate.
In fact, the public procurement process can be divided into three 
main phases summarised in the following table.36
Phases of public 
procurement and 
work execution
Steps of the public procure-
ment process
Activities of the companies
1. Pre- tender stage
Allocation of public funds lobbying
Choice of the tender proce-
dure
- -
Writing of public bidding and 
tender specifications 
- -
Publication of the tender 
documents
- -
2. Tender stage
Designation of the evaluation 
board 
- -
Selection procedure Submission of application
Provisional award - -
Final award - -
Signature of the contract - -
3. Post-award stage
Start of the work
Employment of manpower; 
acquisition of everything is 
needed to realise the work 
(materials, services, etc.) 
awarding subcontracts
Control  and work in progress 
inspection; audit
Public work conclusion - -
Testing - -
End of the administrative 
procedure
- -
     The first two stages are part of the procedures aimed at the defini-
tion of public funds available and the selection of firms. These phases 
give opportunities to criminals for influencing the allocation of public 
money process. 
The third stage is linked to the post bidding moment when the pub-
lic work has already been awarded. This phase is particularly attrac-
tive for criminal groups in so far allows to control the building site for 
gaining several advantages. The post bidding protection on site can 
be agreed upon by both sides or forcefully reckoned where payment is 
based on a percentage of the total public work fee.37
South Italy is a good example where infiltration frequently occurs in 
the post bidding phase. The mafia clans/families oblige through intim-
idation and/or agreement entrepreneurs to pay bribes in exchange for 
protection of building site, force sub-contract and/or control material 
71
preview version
How Crimi-
nals Infiltrate 
Public Pro-
curement
acquisition and human resources. The major sectors in the post bid-
ding phase infiltration are linked to infrastructures (Viability, Trans-
port, Waste, Environmental Defence).38
Methods used by organised criminal groups—The practices uti-
lised to tamper with the procedures for the execution of public con-
tacts are various.
First are Collusion/Partnership relations. These practices move 
from relatively simple agreement between two or more participants 
in the public bidding to more complex methods (e.g. the creation of 
networks to control the allocation of public funds, which involve poli-
ticians and high-level public officers who return favours to the organ-
ised crime in exchanges for votes, protection, etc.). One of the most 
sophisticated methods is the partnership between criminals and legal 
market entrepreneurs. It is called “metodo del tavolino” where com-
panies linked to criminal and mafia groups participate in the bidding 
process for allocating public procurements using falsifications. This 
method is most frequently used when the public procurement proce-
dure considers the lowest bid auction system as a selection criterion. 
In this case the contracting authority is usually accomplice.   
Another kind of scheme to infiltrate bidding procedures is the “Car-
tel agreement.” It consists in the networking of companies which take 
part together in the same bidding process, harmonising illegally their 
bids, in order to allocate the public contract to one of them.  
These more complex agreements can be made with the mediation 
and coordination of organised crime groups. These pacts work where 
mafia and criminal groups are more entrenched and infiltrated in 
various sectors of society. They are typical of south Italy during the 
nineties, and during the following years, with particular reference to 
infrastructure biddings.39
The mentioned cases are based on collusive relations which can take 
place among bidders (as in the case of Cartel agreement), not necessar-
ily linked to criminal groups, or among bidders and politicians and/or 
public officials (that can include criminals), or among all subjects in-
volved in a public procurement (including the contracting authority).
Second is Corruption. Corruption is used in public procurement in 
order to obtain the award of a contract in each kind of bidding pro-
cedure (from the close procedure to the competitive dialogue) and in 
each of its phase (starting from the allocation of funds and the prepa-
ration of the tender to the final award). Bribes are mainly used to in-
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fluence the discretional decisions, to obtain classified information and 
acquire political and institutional protection.40
Influencing the allocation of funds or the posting of a public work, 
increase the chance of a specific company to obtain the work, because 
the corrupt public official will use his/her power to help the bidder 
in exchange for a bribe. Then, too, private corrupt entrepreneurs can 
increase their own chances of success simply through the fore-knowl-
edge of administrative practices and timing or institutional decisions 
or the bids of other competitors. The trading of technical or commer-
cial information on bids can take place directly between a private en-
trepreneur and a public official or with the mediation of intermediar-
ies.41
The third means or resource (i.e. political and institutional protec-
tion) is a complex kind of corruption. The uncertainty of the outcome 
of biddings or of the corruptive relationships with public adminis-
trators, can be diminished by the protection of politicians or public 
administrators or powerful persons. These power figures can have 
long-term control on the decisional centres or can have long-lasting 
influence on individual administrative agents.42
Between the third type of corrupt methods and the collusive prac-
tices there is a thin difference. The two are very similar, but the cor-
ruption aimed at political and institutional protection takes place in a 
discontinuing way and only when advantageous. In this case the ex-
change of bribes and favours is simultaneous. So, all subjects part of 
this relation are satisfied in the same moment. Instead, the collusion 
among criminals and public servants is usually part of long-term and 
continuative relations. The advantages are differently received by each 
actor during the time.    
Along with corruption are fraudulent practices, such as misrep-
resentation or omission of facts or documents for influencing a selec-
tion process or the execution of a contract. It is important to say that 
corrupt forms are not used exclusively by criminal groups, but they can 
be utilised by entrepreneurs without links with organised crime.
Third is Coercion. It includes practices as extortions, intimidations, 
threats, blackmails. Organised crime uses such methods when it is 
necessary in order to force entrepreneurs, businessmen, public admin-
istrators to be compliant or collaborative in achieving the goals of the 
criminal group within itself influencing their participation in the pro-
curement process or affecting the execution of a contract.43
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The various methods just pointed out are usually utilised together 
in a combined and/or simultaneous way. Often the crimes are melded 
and used one to affect on another (e.g. public bidding infiltration is 
used, not only for getting power or money, but also for money launder-
ing). The operational methods, as the channels for infiltrating public 
procurement, are chosen considering two important elements:
1. the reasons why a criminal group determines to illegally compete 
in a public bidding (e.g. if an organised criminal group aims for terri-
torial control and/or to infiltrate the socio-political context, the meth-
ods more often used are collusive practices and/or the creation - or 
exploitation - of relational networks among politicians, entrepreneurs, 
public officials and so on. In such cases, the infiltration channel is on 
the level of indirect actions of mediation);
2. the context where organised crime acts. Criminal groups always 
interact with their environment and use local opportunities. Where a 
criminal organisation is well-entrenched, the methods frequently used 
are collusive practices. On the contrary, where an organised crime or-
ganisation is less entrenched, coercive methods, such as extortion and 
intimidation, are more frequent.44
The mixture of various elements brings different levels of criminal 
infiltration into the public sector. According to Buscaglia e van Dijk, 
five infiltrating levels can be identified: corruption and abuse of au-
thority; gradual control of the public contracting agencies manage-
ment; affecting State’s policies.45
Finally, it is worth questioning difference between national and trans-
national public procurements exists. As evidence has shown, the do-
mestic and cross-border public procurement are basically different 
only for the jurisdictional conflicts which characterise the second ones 
and which give numerous opportunities to organised criminals. The 
dissimilarities among national legislations, as well as the problematic 
investigative and judicial cooperation among States, give considerable 
advantages to criminals for minimising risks of their identification, ar-
rest and conviction. The elements potentially increasing risks of crim-
inal infiltration into transnational public works are various: problems 
of international collaboration among polices and judiciary authorities; 
lack of information exchanges; incrimination procedures too long and 
slow; training courses for police agents too expensive.46 In this per-
spective, several criminal and mafia organisations have a transnational 
nature. They operate in various countries acquiring the ability to adapt 
preview version
74
cejiss
1/2016
in new contexts and to tamper with laws.
Conclusion
Examining the phenomenon of criminal infiltration in legal economy 
and specifically in public procurement, two essential aspects came to 
light.  The former is that these crimes cause seriously damages. In fact, 
such crimes threaten the fair competition among companies, increase 
the costs of public works, affects national GDP and compromise eco-
nomic investments in the country. The latter is linked to the favouring 
factors of economic crimes. Among them, the involvement of pro-
fessionals in economic and financial sectors who provide consulting 
services to criminals, plays a key role. Moreover, alliances and/or col-
lusive relations or connivances with entrepreneurs, politicians, public 
administrators, make criminals more and more able to infiltrate public 
sector. As a result, the relational networks among different actors part 
of both legal and illegal world are fundamental basis of the phenom-
enon.
The two aspects just mentioned are recurring elements which 
characterise the criminal infiltration in public procurement issue 
everywhere it takes place. Then, too, the analysis of secondary sourc-
es considered allowed us to identify other important aspects of the 
issue, including the reasons why the organised crime to choose the 
area of public contracts, the main channels of influence into public 
procurement and the methods used. The reasons are mainly linked 
to economic interests, to penal sectors of judicial investigation, to 
the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the public administration and 
to the strategic importance of the public procurement in themselves. 
As well as the specific reasons that make public procurement a profita-
ble sector for illegal activities, the channels (direct and/or indirect) and 
the methods (collusive practices/partnership relations, corruption and 
fraudulent practices, coercive practices) for allocating public funds are 
chosen by various organised crime groups in relations to their specific 
aims and abilities, and the opportunities of the moment and of the 
context
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